北京——与中国官员和经济学家相处时间长了，你就会听到一个有关上世纪80年代日元的故事。
Back then, Americans were upset about Japanese imports flowing into the country, just as they are upset about Chinese imports today. So the United States pushed Japan to let the yen appreciate, thereby making Japanese imports more expensive and American exports to Japan cheaper. Tokyo complied, and the yen surged almost 50 percent from 1985 to 1987.
回想当年，美国人对日本商品源源流入本国感到不安，一如他们今天对中国进口商品的感受。因此，美国敦促日本升值日元，以使日本进口商品更贵，而美国到日本的出口商品则更便宜。东京听从了，日元也从1985年到1987年强劲升值了将近50%。
Yet the imports kept coming. The trade deficit with Japan actually widened to $108 billion in 1987, from $94 billion in 1985. The rising yen wasn’t enough to halt the growth of companies like Sony and Toyota. They had too many advantages, including lower labor costs.
然而商品进口依然如故。实际上，对日本的贸易赤字由1985年的940亿美元扩大到了1987年的1080亿美元。升值的日元不足以遏止像索尼和丰田这类企业的发展。他们优势甚多，其中就包括较低的劳动力成本。
The moral of the story, in the Chinese telling, is that even a sharp rise in China’s renminbi won’t necessarily do much to help the American economy. “Renminbi appreciation may not have a big impact,” Fan Gang, an economist and former government adviser, said last week at a meeting here with American economists and policy makers, “or an impact at all.”
中国人讲这个故事的寓意在于：即便中国的人民币迅速升值，对美国经济也不会有太大帮助。“人民币升值也许不会产生大的影响。”经济学家、前中国政府顾问樊纲上周与美国经济学家和决策者一同出席会议时说道，“或者根本就没影响。”
And it’s true that a stronger renminbi would not be a quick fix for our economic problems, as appealing a notion as that might be. The yen isn’t the only parallel here. The renminbi itself rose 21 percent against the dollar from 2005 to 2008, and the trade deficit continued to widen.
不错，人民币升值不像观点本身那么诱人，并不能立刻解决经济问题。日元不是唯一的前车之鉴，人民币对美元的比值从2005到2008年就曾增加了21%，但贸易赤字仍在继续扩大。
But there is also no question that China’s currency remains undervalued, probably by 20 percent or so. The economics are simple enough. The huge demand for Chinese goods should be driving up the price of its currency, but Beijing has been intervening to prevent that. Getting China to stop will be crucial to correcting the global economy’s imbalances. A stronger renminbi will help China’s people — many of whom are hungry for better living standards, to judge by the recent labor strikes — buy more goods and services, and it will also help the rest of world produce more. But change is not going to happen overnight.
不过中国货币估值偏低是无疑的，幅度约在20%左右。这在经济学上很好解释。对中国商品的巨大需求应该会抬高其货币价格，但北京为阻止此种情况发生实施 了干预。让中国停止这么做对纠正全球经济失衡至为关键。人民币升值将有利于中国百姓——由近期的工人罢工可以看出，他们中的许多人都在渴望更高的生活水平 ——购买更多商品与服务，也将有利于世界其余国家生产更多商品。当然改变不会在一夜之间发生。
China’s Communist Party has had a very good 20-year run by making incremental changes and then watching the benefits accumulate over time. Realistically, that may be the best we can hope for with the renminbi.
中国共产党通过渐进升值货币在过去20年间一直运转得非常不错，随着时间推移，他们也看到了其中的好处。现实地说，这或许是我们对人民币所能期望的最好情况了。
It also happens to be the ultimate moral of the story about the yen — even if Chinese officials tend to leave that part out.
这才是日元故事的根本寓意——虽然中国官员刻意遗漏了这一部分。
A big change in an exchange rate seems at first glance that it should have an immediate impact. Certainly, it has some impact. The 1980s trade deficit with Japan would have grown even more rapidly had the yen not risen.
乍看之下，汇率大变似乎该有立竿见影的效果。当然，这样的效果是存在的。若日元不升值，上世纪80年代对日本的贸易赤字恐怕会上升得快很多。
But there are two main reasons that a stronger renminbi probably will not lead to a rapid hiring increase in the United States.
但是，人民币升值也许不会导致美国失业人数大幅下降，主要原因有二。
The first is that China and United States aren’t the only two countries in the world. Many products that we think of as being made in China, like the iPhone, are really just assembled in China. High-end parts often come from richer countries, like Israel or South Korea. Basic parts can be made in poorer countries, like Vietnam.
一是中、美并非世界上仅有的两个国家。许多我们以为中国制造的产品，如iPhone，实际上不过是在中国组装而已。尖端配件往往来自于更富裕的国家，如以色列或韩国，而基本配件则在更贫困的国家，如越南等地制造。
The entire value of the product counts toward the trade deficit between the United States and China. A stronger renminbi, however, would affect only the portion of the work done in China. And if the renminbi rose enough, some of this work would simply shift to a country like Vietnam (where per capita income is about $3,000, compared with $6,500 in China). Such a shift wouldn’t help close our overall trade deficit.
只有产品的完全价值才影响到美中两国之间的贸易赤字。然而，人民币升值只会影响在中国完成的那部分工作。如果人民币升值充分，不过是有些工作会转移到越 南这样的国家（越南人均收入约为3000美元一年，而中国是6500美元一年）。如此的转移对缩小我们整体贸易赤字没有帮助。
Chinese officials sometimes go so far as to suggest that the value of the renminbi makes little difference. That’s wrong. China’s economy is now large enough that its currency matters. But the issue is more complicated than it first seems.
中国官员有时甚至认为人民币价值没多大关系。这是错误的。中国经济容量庞大，其货币足以发挥重要作用。不过这个问题比它初看上去要复杂得多。
The second reason not to view the exchange rate as a cure-all is that economies, like battleships, tend to turn slowly. Companies rarely move production in a matter of weeks. If they are using a Chinese supplier, it is often cheaper to stick with that supplier for a while, even if costs rise, rather than find a new one in another country.
第二个不能把汇率当作万灵丹的原因是：经济体就如同庞大战舰一般，调头不会那么快。很少有公司在几周内就会调整产量。如果公司正与中国供应商合作，即便成本上升，也会因为其价格一贯便宜而坚持使用一段时间，而不会在其他国家寻找新的供应商。
The car business makes for a good example of what might change and when. The industry may not seem typical of the China story, because it has more to do with American exports than Chinese imports. But exports probably matter more for American jobs anyway, given that low-end toy manufacturing in Guangdong Province isn’t moving to Alabama or Michigan.
要说明什么会改变，以及什么时候会改变，汽车制造业就是一个很好的例子。该产业可能在中国不具有典型性，因为它与美国出口关联的程度超过了与中国进口的关联程度。但不管怎么说，出口或许对美国就业影响更大，总不能假设广东省的低档玩具制造会转往阿拉巴马或密歇根吧。
Like other first-time visitors to China, I have been struck by the number of Buicks on the roads here. In one Beijing traffic jam, three different Buick minivans were idling in the lane next to mine. When was the last time you were surrounded by Buicks?
与其它首次来中国的游客类似，看到路上别克车的数量，我吃惊不小。一次北京交通堵塞中，三辆不同型号的别克微型车就在我相邻车道上停下来。曾几何时，你被别克车包围过？
Unfortunately for American autoworkers, though, none of those Buicks minivans was made in the United States. Buick exports only the high-end Enclave sport utility vehicle to China and makes the rest of its vehicles locally, with a Chinese partner. BMW, similarly, makes the 3- and 5-series here but ships in the costlier 7-series and Z sports cars.
可是，对美国汽车工人而言，不幸的是，这些别克微型车并非美国制造。美国出口到中国的别克车只限于高端昂科雷（Enclave）SUV，其余都是与中国合作企业在当地制造的。奔驰的情形也差不多，3系和5系均在当地制造，只是出口较昂贵的7系和Z型跑车到中国。
With a stronger renminbi, you could see how carmakers might draw the dividing line in a different place, especially as the Chinese car market grows. The highest-margin vehicles would no longer be the only ones that could support the higher labor and shipping costs — not to mention China’s 25 percent vehicle tariff.
若人民币升值，特别是在中国汽车市场增长的环境下，你也许会看到汽车制造商怎样在其他方面另辟蹊径。利润最高的汽车将不再是支撑高价格劳动力和运输成本，以及中国25%汽车关税的唯一选择。
Already, American exports to China are a big deal. They are on pace to equal about $83 billion this year, up from $68 billion last year and $21 billion a decade ago, adjusted for inflation. As a point of reference, $10 billion of gross domestic product equals about 80,000 jobs on average. So every extra $10 billion of goods sold to China is like its own little stimulus program.
美国对中国的出口早就是巨额交易。按目前的进度，今年出口额将达到约830亿美元，按通货膨胀调整后，去年是680亿美元，而十年前才210亿美元。作 为参考，100亿国内生产总值平均相当于约80000个工作岗位。所以每多销售100亿美元商品到中国，就相当于一项我们的短期经济刺激计划。
Like any other stimulus, this one will require some politics — namely, pressuring China and negotiating with it. Companies will have to make clear, as General Electric, Microsoft and others have begun to, that their growth in China depends on the government taking property rights seriously and being more open to foreigners. As one European executive of a Chinese technology firm told me, “Foreigners can’t do anything alone here.”
跟任何其他的刺激计划一样，这一项也需要一些政治活动——也就是说，给中国施加压力并与之协商。公司必须清楚地认识到（通用电气、微软以及其他公司已经 开始认识到）它们在中国的发展有赖于政府对产权的重视及对外国人开放程度的提高。正如一位中国科技公司的欧洲高管对我讲的，“在这儿，外国人不能独行其 事。”
The United States and other countries, meanwhile, will have to look for any possible leverage to reduce tariffs and other barriers and push up the renminbi. China is eager to buy advanced technology, for example, and not all the items on the United States’ forbidden list are truly matters of national security. The Obama administration has started to prune this list.
与此同时，美国及其他国家必须寻求其他可能的杠杆来降低关税和其他壁垒，并推动人民币升值。例如，中国渴望购买先进技术，而并不是美国禁止出口名单上列的所有东西都对国家安全真正有影响，奥巴马政府已经在着手删减这份名单。
Then, of course, there are those bills before Congress ominously threatening to put new tariffs on Chinese imports. The bills have definitely gotten China’s attention. If anything, they are a hotter topic in Beijing than in Washington, filling state-run newspapers and broadcasts.
因而，预警性地威胁对中国进口商品征收新关税的国会议案当然会出现。这些议案肯定已经引起了中国的关注。如果说有什么区别的话，那就是它们在北京是比华盛顿更热的话题，政府报纸和广播媒体都在连篇累牍地报道。
The tricky part now is using the credible threat of tariffs to force a faster rise in the renminbi — which is up only 1.6 percent since 2008, mostly in the last two weeks — without setting off a trade war that would cost jobs in both countries.
现在的微妙之处在于使用关税的可信威胁来迫使人民币更快升值——自2008年以来仅上升了1.6%，而且主要是在最近两星期——而不必去引发影响两国就业的贸易战。
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see the real lesson of that story about the yen is that success can take time. The yen has continued rising, gradually, since the 1980s and even after its fall in the last week it is still more than twice as high versus the dollar as in 1985. Not coincidentally, the trade deficit with Japan, as a share of the economy, has shrunk 66 percent.
凭借后见之明，我们可以看到那个日元故事的真正教训是：成功需要时间。自从上世纪80年代以来，日元不断在缓慢地升值，即使上周下跌之后，它对美元的比值仍然是1985年的2倍。并非巧合，对日本的贸易赤字也分享了经济成果，已经缩水66%。
This is the path that rising economic powers, from Germany to the United States to Japan, have taken before. They start as exporters and then build up a thriving domestic economy. (Japan, alas, hasn’t been so good at the second part.) It’s the path China needs to take now, for the sake of its citizens and for the world.
这是一条经济实力上升之路，从德国到美国再到日本，莫不如此。他们先是作为出口国，然后才建立起繁荣的国内经济。（唉，日本在第二部分做得不怎么好。）中国现在需要走的就是这样一条路，既是为了国内民众，也是为了全世界。
The currency move of the past couple of weeks is a good start — so long as it continues.
过去几周的货币走向是一个好的开始——只要它能持续下去。
